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1. INTRODUCTION
In all countries, the o–cial CPI (Consumer Price Index), which is meant to be repre-
sentative for a certain reference population, is a flxed-weight price index. At least since
Konu˜s (1924), economists have known that a flxed-weight CPI sufiers from a \substitu-
tion bias" relative to a true cost-of-living index which, instead of maintaining constant
the budget shares of the households represented in the index, maintains constant their
living standards or welfare levels. But according to the review of the literature carried
out by a U.S. Senate Commission headed by Michael Boskin (Boskin et al., 1996), this
is not all that is wrong with the U.S. CPI elaborated by the BLS (Bureau of Labor
Statistics).
The Boskin Commission focused on flve sources of bias in the CPI, all of which
are supposed to contribute to an overstatement of the true in°ation in the cost of
living in the U.S.: (1) The substitution bias among commodities, or the \upper level
substitution" problem, causes an estimated upward bias of 0.15 per cent per year. (2)
The way elementary price quotations are aggregated within each geographic zone, or
the \lower level substitution" problem, is responsible for a bias of 0.25 per cent per year.
(3) Consumers adjust their behavior on where to buy in response to price difierences
between the outlets which happen to be sampled by the BLS and other outlets which are
competing with them by lowering prices. The outlet substitution bias due to the failure
of the CPI to re°ect this aspect of consumer behavior, is estimated at 0.10 per cent per
year. The last two sources of bias have to do with the alleged failure of the BLS (4) to
take fully into account the quality changes experienced in many sectors of the economy,
and (5) to introduce in a timely fashion the new products constantly appearing on the
market. These two sources together are supposed to cause a bias of 0.60 per cent per
year.
Thus, the Boskin Commission estimates that, on average, during the last few decades
the U.S. CPI has been overstating the in°ation by 1.1 per cent per year. This bias
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might seem small. However, when compounded over time, the implications for (i)
the public deflcit created through an indexed budget, (ii) the wage bargaining process
and the determination of the nominal interest rates in the private sector, and (iii) the
measurement of the economic performance in real terms, are little short of catastrophic.1
Be this as it may, the fact is that the report has become already very in°uential.2 This
does not mean, of course, that it has escaped criticism. Some critics question the
Commission’s analysis of each and every one of the flve sources of bias (Moulton et al.,
1998). Others point out toward neglected issues and, in particular, the scant attention
paid to distributional issues to which we now turn our attention |see, e.g., Pollak
(1998), Deaton (1998), and Madrick (1997).
In the CPI context, the issues raised by the heterogeneity of the population are
usually identifled by asking \Whose cost-of-living index?," a question which is seen to
contain three issues in Pollak (1998). \How many cost-of-living indexes?," \Beer or
champagne?," and \What type of group indexes?" The flrst issue refers to whether
we should have difierent indexes for difierent groups |rich and poor, elderly and non-
elderly, urban and rural, etc. The second issue refers to the selection of the appropriate
set of items, qualities and outlets that are to be re°ected in the index.3
Assume that the population of households (individuals or consumers) for whom a
representative index must be constructed has been decided, and that a solution has been
found for the beer-vs-champagne issue. The third issue, which is the topic of this paper,
originates with the nature of the CPI as a group index. Given the commodity space
and a household budget survey representative of the reference population, we can use
1 For an evaluation of these sources of bias in the measurement of in°ation through the o–cial Spanish
price index and its implications for the Spanish economy, see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999b).
2 As Diewert (1998) puts it: \: : : with a total budget of $25,000, Boskin, Dulberger, Griliches, Gordon
and Jorgenson have probably written the most important measurement paper of the century in terms
of its impact: Every statistical agency in the world is revaluating its price measurement techniques as
a direct result of their report and the widespread publicity it has received."
3 Against the view of the Boskin Commission and Diewert (1995) that the \lower level substitution"
problem is primarily a problem of choosing an appropriate formula for combining the prices of items,
Pollak (1995, 1998) argues that it is primarily a problem of selecting the \items" to be priced, and
re°ects fundamental ambiguities in the meaning of \goods," \commodities," and \items" at theoretical
and empirical levels.
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each household’s budget shares as the flxed weights for the construction of household-
speciflc price indexes. Since Prais (1958), we know that the CPI is the weighted average
of such individual price indexes with weights proportional to each household’s total
expenditures. Because richer households weigh more than poor ones, Prais baptized
the CPI as a plutocratic price index. The question is whether we can think of a better
alternative to this particular construction.4
In this paper, we defend that the so-called democratic index, in which all households
receive the same weight, is an option worth pursuing. Thus, we deflne the plutocratic
bias as the difierence between the in°ation measured according to the current o–cial CPI
and a democratic index. We ofier two reasons for being interested in such a concept.
In the flrst place, it is always interesting to know who sufiers the greatest in°ation:
those households with the largest total expenditures, or those at the bottom of the
distribution, in which case we would say that prices have behaved in an anti-rich or an
anti-poor manner, respectively. In the flrst (second) case we should expect that the mean
in°ation weighted by the total household expenditures would be greater (smaller) than
the simple mean. Thus, the plutocratic bias would be positive or negative according
to whether prices have behaved in an anti-rich or in an anti-poor manner, respectively
|this idea can be traced back to Fry and Pashardes (1985).
In the second place, when two distributions of household expenditure, or income,
are expressed at constant prices using household-speciflc price indexes, the change in
nominal income inequality |which is the magnitude usually estimated in the empirical
literature| is seen to be equal to the change in real income inequality plus a price term
which captures the distributional impact of price changes.5 Knowledge of the sign of
the plutocratic bias takes us a long way in the direction of knowing the sign of the price
term. Thus, whether a given change in money income inequality is smaller (larger)
4 As pointed out by Pollak (1998), the flrst two issues are given a cursory treatment in footnote 2
and page 71 of Boskin et al. (1996). The Boskin Commission never addresses the third issue directly,
although Pollak selects some passages of its report which appear to re°ect an implicit judgement that
the CPI ought to be a plutocratic price index.
5 The idea that price movements should be included in intertemporal income inequality comparisons
was originally suggested by Iyengar and Battacharya (1965). Subsequently, in a social welfare con-
text Muellbauer (1974) showed that under general assumptions on individual preferences real income
inequality comparisons are not price independent.
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than the socially relevant change in real income inequality depends to a large extent on
whether the plutocratic bias is positive (negative).
Nevertheless, the importance of this concept depends crucially on its empirical mag-
nitude. Our main result is that the plutocratic bias in Spain during the 1990s is equal
to 0.055 per cent per year |or about one third of the classical substitution bias es-
timated by the Boskin Commission for the U.S. Nonetheless, averaging magnitudes of
difierent signs underestimates the real importance of this bias. The bias in speciflc years
oscillates from a maximum of 0:150 to a minimum of ¡0:080 per cent per year. Inter-
estingly, neither the sign nor the magnitude of the bias in a given subperiod depends
on the magnitude of the in°ation in that subperiod. Using the total expenditures elas-
ticities estimated in an Engel curve system, we flnd that a 16-dimensional commodity
space can be conveniently reduced to 3 dimensions, consisting of a luxury good and two
necessities. The price behavior of these 3 goods provides a convincing explanation of the
oscillations experimented by the plutocratic bias. Finally, the fact that the plutocratic
bias is positive, implies that the gap between the changes in nominal and real household
expenditures inequality during the 1990s is between 2 and 5 per cent, depending on the
inequality measure and the importance we give to the scale economies in consumption
within the household.
The paper studies the robustness of these results in two dimensions. In the flrst place,
we estimate the plutocratic bias for the 1980s and the second part of the 1970s in Spain.
We flnd that, on average, the bias is small in the flrst case and large in the second: 0.033
and 0.239 per cent per year, respectively.6 In the second place, we ask what would have
been the bias in the measurement of in°ation if instead of using the plutocratic CPI we
were to use a group index equal to the weighted mean of the household-speciflc indexes
with weights proportional to the household size. We flnd that such a bias for the 1990s,
the 1980s and the second part of the 1970s would be equal to 0.088, 0.015 and 0.223
per cent per year, respectively.
6 The sign and the magnitude of the bias for these two periods are consistent with previous flndings
about the fact that the decrease in the real household’s total expenditures inequality is greater than
the decrease in the money inequality |see Del R¶‡o and Ruiz-Castillo (1996), and Ruiz-Castillo and
Sastre (1999).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the essentials on
individual and aggregate price indexes. Section 3 presents the empirical results on the
plutocratic bias in Spain during the 1990s, while Section 4 studies the implications
for total household expenditures inequality measurement. Section 5 is devoted to the
robustness of those results during previous periods, and the use of weighted group
indexes with weights proportional to household size. Section 6 summarizes and discusses
the political implications of our results in a heavily indexed economy.
2. INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP INDEXES
2.1. Individual Price Indexes
Let there be I goods and H households indexed by i = 1; : : : ; I and h = 1; : : : ; H,
respectively, and let q = (q1; : : : ; qI) be a commodity vector. Each household h is
characterized by her total expenditures, xh, and her preferences represented by a utility
function, u = Uh(q). Assume that all households have the same preferences, so that
u = Uh(q) = U(q) for all h, and let c(u;p) be the cost function, which gives the
minimum cost of achieving the utility level u at prices p. Under general conditions, we
know that xh = c(U(qh);p), where qh is the utility-maximizing commodity vector at
prices p when the household expenditures are xh.
Consider two price vectors p0 and pt in periods 0 and t. A true or a Konu˜s cost-of-
living index (COLI for short) which takes as its reference the utility level uh, is deflned
as the ratio of the minimum cost of achieving that utility level at prices pt and p0, i.e.,
•(pt;p0;uh) =
c(pt; uh)
c(p0; uh)
:
When the reference utility is the utility-maximizing level at prices p0, denoted by uh0 ,
we say that the COLI •(pt;p0;uh0 ) = c(pt; u
h
0 )=c(p0; u
h
0 ) is a Laspeyres type index.
Given a reference commodity vector, qh, we can deflne a statistical price index (SPI)
as the ratio of the cost of acquiring qh at prices pt and p0,7
‘(pt;p0; qh) =
pt ¢ qh
p0 ¢ qh :
7 An SPI can also be written as a weighted average of individual-commodity indexes. Let whi0 be the
good-i household budget share at prices p0, i.e., whi0 = pi0q
h
i0=p0q
h
0 . Then we have that ‘(pt;p0; q
h
0 ) =P
i
whi0(pit=pi0).
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When qh = qh0 , the utility-maximizing consumption bundle at prices p0, we say that
the SPI ‘(pt;p0; qh0 ) = pt ¢ qh0=p0 ¢ qh0 is a Laspeyres type index.
A fundamental theorem in Konu˜s (1924) establishes that, under general assumptions,
the Laspeyres SPI provides an upper bound to the Laspeyres COLI,
•(pt;p0;uh0 ) • ‘(pt;p0; qh0 ):
Equality is obtained when preferences are of the Leontief type, i.e., when there is no
substitution between goods.
2.2. The CPI
Deflne the vector of aggregate quantities bought in situation 0 by Q0 = (Q10; : : : ; QI0),
where Qi0 =
P
h q
h
i0, and let Wi0 = pi0Qi0=p0 ¢Q0. The aggregate Laspeyres SPI |for
period t based on period 0| is then deflned as follows:
L(pt;p0; Q0) =
X
i
Wi0
pit
pi0
=
pt ¢Q0
p0 ¢Q0 : (1)
However, the CPI actually computed by statistical agencies is not exactly an aggregate
price index of the type deflned in equation (1). The reason is that individual behavior
is typically investigated by means of a household budget survey conducted in a period
¿ prior to the index base period 0. As it is shown in the Appendix, the CPI based on
period 0 is an aggregate SPI deflned by8
CPI(pt;p0; Q¿ ) =
L(pt;p¿ ; Q¿ )
L(p0;p¿ ; Q¿ ) =
pt ¢Q¿
p0 ¢Q¿ : (2)
This is what the BLS calls a modifled Laspeyres aggregate price index (Moulton, 1996).
What are the normative bases for such a construction? To answer this question we need
to deflne a set of household-speciflc modifled Laspeyres price indexes:
cpi(pt;p0; qh¿ ) =
‘(pt;p¿ ; qh¿ )
‘(p0;p¿ ; qh¿ )
=
pt ¢ qh¿
p0 ¢ qh¿
:
8 Note that we could instead use average quantities, „Q¿ , with elements „Qi¿ =
1
H
Qi¿ , since the
1
H
terms in the numerator and denominator would cancel ofi. Hence the notion of the CPI being referred
to an ‘average consumer.’
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For each h, let uh¿ = U(q
h
¿ ). It is easy to see that the ratio of the corresponding
Laspeyres COLIs leads to what we can call a modifled Laspeyres COLI:
•(pt;p¿ ;uh¿ )
•(p0;p¿ ;uh¿ )
=
c(pt; uh¿ )
c(p0; uh¿ )
= •(pt;p0;uh¿ ):
Konu˜s theorem assures that, for each h, ‘(p0;p¿ ; qh¿ )¡•(p0;p¿ ;uh¿ ) ‚ 0 and ‘(pt;p¿ ; qh¿ )¡
•(pt;p¿ ;uh¿ ) ‚ 0, but it says nothing about the ratio of the Laspeyres indexes which
give rise to an individual CPI. However, the household budget survey collection pe-
riod ¿ is typically not far apart from the base year 0 of the CPI system. Thus, under
the assumption that the substitution bias ‘(p0;p¿ ; qh¿ ) ¡ •(p0;p¿ ;uh¿ ) is smaller than
‘(pt;p¿ ; qh¿ ) ¡ •(pt;p¿ ;uh¿ ), we have that a household-speciflc CPI provides an upper
bound to a modifled Laspeyres COLI. As shown in the Appendix,
CPI(pt;p0; Q¿ ) =
X
h
`h cpi(pt;p0; qh¿ )
where `h = p0 ¢ qh¿=p0 ¢Q¿ . Thus, only under the assumption that, for a su–ciently
large number of households,
cpi(pt;p0; qh¿ ) =
‘(pt;p¿ ; qh¿ )
‘(p0;p¿ ; qh¿ )
‚ •(pt;p¿ ;u
h
¿ )
•(p0;p¿ ;uh¿ )
= •(pt;p0; uh¿ );
then the aggregate CPI provides an upper bound to a plutocratic-weighted mean of mod-
ifled Laspeyres COLIs:9 CPI(pt;p0; Q¿ ) ‚
P
h `
h •(pt;p0; qh¿ ). Otherwise it would
instead provide a lower bound. Nonetheless, the proximity of the theoretical construct
|i.e., a COLI| and the empirical counterpart |i.e., the CPI| constitutes a rather
remarkable situation.
9 In the democratic case, we have that 1
H
P
h
‘(pt;p0; qh¿ ) ‚ 1H
P
h
•(pt;p0; qh¿ ). Under the same
assumption, the simple mean of modifled Laspeyres SPIs constitutes an upper bound to the simple
mean of modifled Laspeyres COLIs.
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3. THE PLUTOCRATIC BIAS
3.1. The Data
In order to estimate the plutocratic bias deflned below, we need to construct a series of
household-speciflc Laspeyres price indexes. For that purpose, we use the following two
pieces of publicly available information in Spain: the 1990{91 household-budget survey
(EPF) used to estimate the weights of the o–cial CPI, and a set of price subindexes at
a certain level of spatial and commodity disaggregation.
The EPF (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares) collected by the Spanish statisti-
cal agency, INE (Instituto Nacional de Estad¶‡stica), from April 1990 to March 1991,
is a household budget survey of 21,155 household sample points, representative of a
population of approximately 11 milllion households and 38 million persons occupying
residential housing in all of Spain, including the North African cities of Ceuta and
Melilla.
The INE collects elementary price indexes (denoted by Eijt in the Appendix) for a
commodity basket consisting of 471 items in each of the 52 provinces under the CPI
present system, based in 1992. For confldentiality reasons, the INE does not publish this
information at the maximum disaggregation level. Instead, it publishes on a monthly
basis price subindexes for the period January 1993 to January 1998 for a commodity
breakdown of 110 subclases, 57 r¶ubricas, 33 subgrupos and 8 grupos at the national level,
the r¶ubricas, subgrupos and grupos at the 18 Autonomous Community level, and the
subgrupos and grupos at the 52 province level.
For any commodity breakdown, it is possible to reconstruct the o–cial CPI series
using an appropriately deflned aggregate budget shares vector. Similarly, deflning a
budget share vector for every household in the 1990{91 sample, we can obtain a series of
household-speciflc CPIs for any commodity breakdown. In principle, the only difierence
between alternative speciflcations of the commodity space, is that the dispersion of
the set of individual CPIs should be greater the greater the disaggregation level of the
price information used in their construction. Unfortunately, in spite of using the same
informational basis as the INE |namely, the 1990{91 EPF| we flnd several small
discrepancies between our estimates of the aggregate budget share vectors and those
8
        
published by the INE |for the details, see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999b). Thus, the CPI
series which we can reconstruct vary slightly depending on the difierent commodity
breakdowns characterizing the price information we use. In Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999b)
we flnd that the speciflcation consisting of the 21 food r¶ubricas at the Autonomous
Community level, and the 32 non-food subgrupos at the provincial level outperforms
the rest of the alternatives according to various statistical and economic criteria.
It should be emphasized that our series of household-speciflc price indexes deflned
over this 53 commodity space difier from the series underlying the o–cial CPI in two
ways. In the flrst place, there are a number of aspects in the o–cial deflnition of total
household expenditures for which we believe there are superior alternatives. We refer to:
(i) the deflnition of housing expenditures for households occupying non-rental housing;
(ii) the inclusion of imputations for home production, wages in kind and subsidized
meals, and (iii) the estimation of annual food and drink expenditures using all the
available information on bulk purchases in the 1990{91 EPF. The joint impact of these
modiflcations is important: according to Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999b), the o–cial CPI
understates the true Spanish in°ation from 1992 to January of 1998 in 0.241 per cent
per year.
In the second place, it should be noticed that the Spanish CPI is not the modifled
Laspeyres price index deflned in equation (2), which takes as a reference the mean
quantity vector actually acquired by the EPF households at the time they were inter-
viewed in the 1990{91 survey period. The reason is that the INE does not use the
adjustment factors Aij¿ deflned in the Appendix. Fortunately, Lorenzo (1998) provides
such factors for the 110 subclases at the national level. Using this information, for each
household h interviewed in a quarter ¿ during the 1990{91 period (¿ = Spring, Sum-
mer, Autumn of 1990, and Winter of 1991), we construct a series of modifled Laspeyres
SPIs, ‘(pt;p0; qh¿ ), based on period 0 = Winter of 1991, which takes as a reference the
commodity vector qh¿ actually acquired during the interview quarter ¿ :
10
10 If we normalize this series at prices of period 0 = 1992, we can obtain the conceptually correct
CPI, that is, ‘(pt;p¿ ; qh¿ )=‘(p0;p¿ ; q
h
¿ ) = pt ¢ qh¿ =p0 ¢ qh¿ = CPIh(pt;p0; qh¿ ). For the details of this
construction, see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999a). This series of modifled Laspeyres price indexes is available
at http://www.eco.uc3m.es/investigacion/epf.html.
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3.2. A Deflnition of the Plutocratic Bias
We will divide the period Winter 1991{January 1998 in the 7 subperiods shown on table
1 below. For each h we deflne the in°ation (or de°ation) caused by the evolution of
prices in a given subperiod by:
…ht =
‘ht ¡ ‘ht¡1
‘ht¡1
The distribution of individual in°ations in each subperiod is denoted by …t = (…1t ; : : : ; …
H
t ).
For the entire period, we have ƒ = (ƒ1; : : : ;ƒH), where ƒh = (‘hT¡1), where T = Jan98.
The aggregate in°ation for the population as a whole according to the plutocratic scheme
is
PLUTt =
P
h `
h (‘ht ¡ ‘ht¡1)P
h `
h‘ht¡1
=
P
h(`
h‘ht¡1) (‘
h
t ¡ ‘ht¡1)=‘ht¡1P
h `
h‘ht¡1
=
X
h
ˆht …
h
t ;
where ˆht = `
h‘ht¡1=
P
h `
h‘ht¡1. For the democratic scheme,
DEMt =
P
h ‘
h
t ¡ ‘ht¡1P
h ‘
h
t¡1
=
X
h
»ht …
h
t ;
where »ht = ‘
h
t¡1=
P
h ‘
h
t¡1 |note that ˆ
h
t is proportional to `
h»ht . Since ‘
h
0 = 1,
for the overall period from 0 to T the weights simplify to `h and 1H and we have
PLUT =
P
h `
h (‘hT ¡ 1), and DEM = 1H
P
h(‘
h
T ¡ 1). We deflne the plutocratic bias
in the measurement of in°ation in subperiod t by Bt = PLUTt ¡ DEMt, and for the
overall period by B = PLUT¡DEM.11 Notice that, as pointed out in the Introduction,
if price changes in subperiod t (or for the entire period) are relatively more detrimental
to the rich, i.e., if …ht (or ƒ
h) are greater for the rich than for the poor households, then
we expect the plutocratic mean of individual in°ations in the plutocratic case to be
greater than the democratic mean. That is, Bt or B are positive (negative) according
to whether the price change in the corresponding time interval is anti-rich (anti-poor).
3.3. The Main Findings
In the flrst two columns of Table 1 we show the plutocratic and the democratic means
of both ƒ and …t. For comparative purposes with the measurement units used by the
11 Note that the in°ation rate does not display temporal separability |i.e., the in°ation for a given
period does not equal the sum of in°ations for a partition of that period. If the in°ation rate were
deflned instead as the log price change, then temporal separabilty would hold but group separability
would be lost.
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Boskin Commission, all flgures are expressed in annual terms. Notice that the aggregate
in°ation keeps decreasing over time, from a high 6.9 percentage points during the flrst
subperiod to a low 2.4 percentage points during 1997. In column 3 we measure the
plutocratic bias as the difierence between the plutocratic and the democratic means
of distributions ƒ and …t. Note, however, that this summary for the whole period
understates the true importance of the plutocratic bias since the positive and negative
biases in various subperiods ofiset each other.
Table 1. The Plutocratic Bias During the 1990s
(In Percent Per Year)
In°ation
t Subperiods Plutocratic Democratic Plutocratic bias
1 Winter 91 to 1992 6.989 6.911 0.078
2 1992 to Jan 1993 5.394 5.244 0.150
3 Jan 93 to Jan 94 5.271 5.165 0.105
4 Jan 94 to Jan 95 4.621 4.701 -0.080
5 Jan 95 to Jan 96 4.079 4.130 -0.050
6 Jan 96 to Jan 97 3.180 3.090 0.090
7 Jan 97 to Jan 98 2.494 2.369 0.125
Winter 91 to Jan 98 4.632 4.577 0.055
The main flndings are the followings three: (1) For the period as a whole, B is
positive and equal to 0.055 per cent per year. This is, approximately, one third of the
substitution bias estimated by the Boskin Commission for the U.S. economy, which is
equal to 0.15 per cent per year. (2) Price behavior is not uniform over the entire period:
Bt is negative during 1994 and 1995, indicating that during these two years prices have
caused relatively more damage to the poor than to the rich households. (3) Neither the
sign nor the magnitude of Bt in a given period depends on whether in°ation is large or
small during that period.
3.4. An Economic Interpretation
Which goods are primarily consumed by the poor or the rich households? To answer
this question, we must begin by recognizing the fact that, in a heterogeneous world,
total expenditures of households with difierent characteristics are not directly compa-
rable. Following Buhmann et al. (1988) and Coulter et al. (1992a, 1992b), we adopt
an equivalence scale model in which scale economies in consumption depend only on
11
     
household size, sh, and adjusted total household expenditures are deflned by
yh =
xh
(sh)µ
; µ 2 [0; 1] (3)
When µ = 0, adjusted expenditures coincide with unadjusted household expenditures,
while if µ = 1, it becomes per capita household expenditures. Taking a single adult as
the reference type, the expression sµ can be interpreted as the number of equivalent
adults in a household of size s. Thus, the greater the equivalence elasticity µ, the
smaller the scale economies in consumption or, in other words, the larger the number
of equivalent adults.
Table 2. Budget Shares in the Distribution of Adjusted Household Expenditures (µ = 0:5),
and Total Expenditure Elasticities for 16 Goods
Quintiles
GOODS Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All Elasticities
1. Personal Transportation 5.00 7.65 9.51 11.51 14.87 11.54 1.655
2. Clothing 4.98 6.24 7.52 8.36 8.58 7.79 1.593
3. Furniture 0.55 0.85 1.05 1.30 1.64 1.28 1.734
4. Domestic Services 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.57 1.46 0.78 2.242
5. Leisure, Education, Cultural 3.27 4.74 5.80 6.68 7.34 6.30 1.189
6. Other Personal Services 7.88 10.55 11.94 13.43 14.71 12.92 1.340
7. Other Household Goods 1.65 1.86 1.94 1.94 2.09 1.97 1.239
8. Medicine 2.07 2.37 2.65 2.65 2.76 2.62 1.253
LUXURY GOODS (1 + ... + 8) 25.54 34.45 40.66 46.44 53.45 45.20 1.451
9. Fooda 33.75 27.41 23.37 19.39 13.23 19.69 0.566
10. Housing Utilities 4.63 3.61 3.11 2.61 2.04 2.74 0.482
NECESSITIES I (9 + 10 ) 38.38 31.02 26.48 22.0 15.27 22.43 0.555
11. Alcoholic Drinks and Tobacco 3.16 3.02 2.82 2.57 1.97 2.48 0.847
12. Remainder of Group Ib 4.48 4.53 4.58 4.14 3.25 3.94 0.811
13. Shoes 1.79 2.03 1.98 1.95 1.61 1.82 1.097
14. Housing 21.72 20.31 19.24 18.81 21.16 20.20 0.874
15. Other Transport and Comm. 2.46 2.40 2.37 2.44 2.15 2.31 0.775
16. Household Maintenance 2.46 2.24 1.88 1.64 1.14 1.62 0.795
NECESSITIES II (11 + ... + 16) 36.07 34.53 32.87 31.55 31.28 32.37 0.866
aExcept \Other Food Products" (beef, prepared flsh, fruit preserves and other unclassifled foods)
b\Non-alcoholic Drinks" and \Other Food Products."
In Table 2, we present the budget shares for the quintiles of the distribution of ad-
justed total expenditures for an intermediate value of µ = 12 . The commodity space
consists of 16 goods, classifled in three groups according to whether their total expen-
ditures elasticity is greater than 1 (luxuries), considerably smaller than 1 (necessities I,
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dominated by Food expenditures), or weakly smaller than 1 (necessities II, dominated
by Housing expenditures). The total expenditure elasticities are estimated at the mean
of the variables in the following system of Engel-curve regressions:
whi = fii + fli ln(y
h) + °izh + "hi ; i = 1; : : : ; 16;
where: "hi is an error term; y
h = xh=
p
sh is total household expenditures adjusted for
household size with parameter µ = 12 ; and z
h is a vector of household characteristics
including (i) demographic variables (household size and composition, the household
head’s age and age squared), (ii) socioeconomic variables (number of income earners,
educational level and socioeconomic category of the household head, educational level
and labor status of the spouse, number of dwellings and characteristics of the resi-
dential unit), as well as (iii) seasonal and geographic variables (municipality size and
Autonomous Community of residence). In Figure 1 we display the joint distribution of
the individual budget shares for these three goods and the logarithm of the adjusted to-
tal household expenditures,12 the last panel shows the estimated Engel curves (trimming
the 1 percent tails ofi the support of the adjusted household expenditures).
[Insert Figure 1]
Intuitively, the evolution of prices would tend to damage to relatively greater extent
the richer households over the poorer ones according to whether the luxury good or the
necessities experience the greatest relative increase. For the entire period, the in°ation
experienced by the luxury good and the two necessities are 31.59, 21.08, and 38.46 index
points, respectively. In Figure 2 we represent the evolution of the inter-annual in°ation
of the three goods in relation to the general in°ation as well as the inter-annual Bt, t =
January 1992,: : :,January 1998.
[Insert Figure 2]
In spite of the fact that the second necessity shows the stronger price growth, the
behavior of the luxury good and the flrst necessity is the main explanatory force behind
12 The boxplots on the top margins show the 1, 25, 50, 75 and 99 percentiles.
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the positive sign of the plutocratic bias. To test this idea, we run a regression of the inter-
annual (January to January) plutocratic bias Bt, from t = January 1992,: : :, January
1998, on the corresponding monthly inter-annual price subindexes for the 3 goods and
a constant. The results, with robust t-ratios in parentheses (generalized least-squares
and Cochrane-Orcutt regressions yield identical results), are the following:
B^t = 0:025 + 0:050Lt ¡ 0:056NIt ¡ 0:0043NIIt R2 = 0:96
(1:80) (9:95) (¡42:14) (¡0:75)
All the coe–cients have the expected sign |although the one corresponding to Necessi-
ties II (NII) is not statistically signiflcant| and the results corroborate the explanatory
power of the Luxury good (L) and Necessities I (NI).
4. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT
4.1. The Change in Money and Real Inequality
Let us assume that we want to compare the household income or expenditures distri-
butions in two difierent time periods, x0 = (x10; : : : ; x
H
0 ) and xt = (x
1
t ; : : : ; x
H0
t ), with
H 0 not necessarily equal to H. Let p0 and pt be the price vectors in the two situations.
For each h, we can express the household’s total expenditures in situation 0 at prices
pt, xh0;t, by multiplying her original money income in period 0, x
h
0 , by an SPI of the
Laspeyres type:
xh0;t = x
h
0 ‘(pt;p0; q
h
0 ) = p0 ¢ qh0
pt ¢ qh0
p0 ¢ qh0
= pt ¢ qh0 :
For any H ‚ 2, let I : <H 7! < be any convenient inequality index satisfying
continuity, S-concavity, scale independence and replication population invariance. The
change in money income inequality, ¢M , can be expressed as the sum of two terms:
¢M = I(xt)¡ I(x0) = [I(xt)¡ I(x0;t)] + [I(x0;t)¡ I(xt)] = ¢R+ ¢P; (4)
where ¢R = I(xt)¡I(x0;t) is the change in real income inequality and ¢P = I(x0;t)¡
I(xt) captures the distributional impact of price changes on inequality measurement
according to the households’ preferences at period 0.13 >From a social point of view, we
13 We could have expressed the distribution in situation t at prices p0 by using an appropriate Paassche
type price index. In this case, ¢P = I(xt) ¡ I(xt;0) would have measured the distributional impact
of price changes according to the households’ preferences at t.
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are primarily interested in the sign of ¢R. However, in the absence of household-speciflc
price indexes |which is the dominant situation in the empirical literature| researchers
usually measure only ¢M . Therefore, it is important to know the relationship between
¢R and ¢M when the change from p0 to pt is not neutral, that is, when ¢P is difierent
from 0.
The compensating variation introduced by Hicks (1940), CV h, is the amount of
money that household h must receive in compensation for the price change from p0 to
pt, i.e.,
CV h = xh0;t ¡ xh0 = (‘(pt;p0; qh0 )¡ 1)£ xh0 = …ht xh0 : (5)
As before, the plutocratic bias is deflned as Bt =
P
h(`
h ¡ 1H )…ht . Intuitively, when
Bt > 0, for example, household in°ation …ht tends to be greater for the rich than for
the poor households. Taking equation (5) into account, in this case we expect the
compensating variation to be also greater for the rich than for the poor households.
Given that x0;t = x0 + CV, where CV = (CV 1; : : : ; CV H), as long as I(CV) > I(x0)
we have that I(x0;t) > I(x0) or, in other terms, ¢P > 0.14 In view of (4), we expect
that ¢M><¢R as long as Bt
>
<0. This means that when, for instance, Bt > 0 |so
that the price change from p0 to pt is anti-rich| then the term ¢P is positive and
¢M > ¢R. In this case, (i) if the normatively signiflcant term ¢R is positive, so that
there has been an increase in real income inequality, then the change in money income
inequality would overstate the socially relevant magnitude. (ii) Conversely, if ¢R < 0,
then ¢M would understate the reduction in real income inequality.
4.2. Results
Let us identify situation with the Winter 1991 and t with T , i.e., January 1998 |so
that, as before, we drop the subscript from B. Since, as we have seen, B = 0:055 per
cent per year during this period, we expect the term ¢P to be positive. To verify this
circumstance, we must select an inequality index.
14 Note that the reverse need not be the case. It might be that I(x0;t) > I(x0) because the vector
CV is very unequal and there are a lot of re-orderings between xt and CV. A re-ordering between x0
and CV means that, for a pair of households h and h0, xh0 > x
h0
0 but CV
h = …ht x
h
0 < CV
h0 = …h
0
t x
h0
0 .
Therefore, …ht > …
h0
t , i.e., the in°ation would be greater for the rich than for the poor household and the
plutocratic mean of … could be smaller than the democratic mean. Thus, in spite of I(x0;t) > I(x0),
we can have that Bt < 0.
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It is well known that the Generalized Entropy family of inequality indexes are the
only measures of relative inequality that satisfy the usual normative properties required
from any inequality index and, in addition, are decomposable by population subgroups
|see, e.g., Shorrocks (1984). The family can be described by means of the following
convenient cardinalization:
Ic(y(µ)) = 1
H
1
c2 ¡ c
X
h
µµ
yh(µ)
„(y(µ))
¶c
¡ 1
¶
; c 2 (0; 1)
I0(y(µ)) = 1
H
X
h
¡ ln
µ
yh(µ)
„(y(µ))
¶
;
I1(y(µ)) = 1
H
X
h
µ
yh(µ)
„(y(µ))
¶
ln
µ
yh(µ)
„(y(µ))
¶
;
(6)
where y(µ) is the distribution of adjusted total household expenditures deflned in equa-
tion (3), and „(¢) stands for the mean of the distribution. The parameter c summarizes
the sensitivity of Ic in difierent parts of the total household expenditures distribution:
the more positive (negative) c is, the more sensitive Ic is to difierences at the top (bot-
tom) of the distribution |see Cowell and Kuga (1981). I1 is the original Theil index,
while I0 is the mean logarithmic deviation.
In Table 3 we present the estimates for ¢Pc(µ) for the parameter values c = ¡1; 0; 1; 2
and µ = 0:0; 0:5; 1:0. These values have been estimated using 1,000 Bootstrap samples.15
In each Bootstrap sample we draw 21,155 households using stratifled resampling accord-
ing to the 260 strata in the original survey. For each (c; µ) pair, we obtain a Bootstrap
distribution of 1,000 inequality measures.
Table 3. The Distributional Efiect of Price Changes on
Adjusted Total Household Inequality During the 1990s
(Bootstrap Standard Errors in parentheses)
c = ¡1 c = 0 c = 1 c = 2
µ = 0:0 2.43 2.06 2.36 3.15
(0.1619) (0.1264) (0.2102) (0.6065)
µ = 0:5 3.19 2.97 3.27 4.09
(0.1692) (0.1506) (0.2505) (0.6727)
µ = 1:0 3.29 3.24 3.67 5.02
(0.1669) (0.1542) (0.2506) (0.6242)
15 See Hall (1992) for a description of Bootstrap methods and Mills and Zandvakili (1997) for an
application to income inequality measurement.
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For every µ, the increase in income inequality is slightly greater for c = ¡1 and,
above all, for c = 2. This means that prices have afiected primarily households at both
ends of the distribution and, above all, to those at the upper tail. On the other hand,
for every c, ¢Pc(µ) increases slightly as µ increases, that is, as the importance of scale
economies diminishes. At any rate, we flnd that, as expected, ¢Pc(µ) > 0 for all c
and µ and, in view of the standard errors, this increase in inequality is statistically
signiflcant. Thus, because prices have behaved in an anti-rich manner during 1991{
1998, we conclude that the inequality of the 1990{91 adjusted household expenditures
inequality is between 2 and 5 per cent greater in January 1998 than in the Winter
of 1991. Assume that we have data on household expenditures in 1998 and that the
change in money household expenditures inequality is to be equal to 10 per cent, for
example. According to equation (4), our results on ¢Pc(µ) imply that the increase in real
household expenditures inequality would be only between 5 and 8 per cent depending
on the values of µ and c. If the change in money household expenditures inequality were
to be equal to ¡10 per cent, then the decrease in real household expenditures inequality
would be 12 or 15 per cent.
5. ROBUSTNESS
5.1. The Time Period
In this subsection we study the robustness of our results on the B trend in two difierent
directions. In the flrst place, we consider the period covered by the two previous Spanish
CPI systems, which run from August 1985 to December 1992 (base year = 1983) , and
from January 1977 to July 1985 (base year = 1976), respectively. The EPFs which
serve to estimate the o–cial weights were conducted from April 1980 to March 1981,
and from July 1973 to June 1974, respectively. These are household budget surveys
strictly comparable to the 1990{91 EPF, containing 23,972 and 24,151 household sample
units, representative of, approximately, a population of 10 or 9 million households and
37 or 34 million persons in 1980{81 or 1973{74. In this case, we do not have reasons
to depart from the o–cial deflnition of total household expenditures, but we must
take into account that, as before, the Spanish CPI is not a modifled Laspeyres price
index. We construct two series of appropriate household-speciflc price indexes with the
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information provided by: (i) the 1980-81 and 1973-74 EPFs; (ii) the o–cial monthly
price information for 58 and 57 r¶ubricas at the national level in the 1983 and 1976
bases, respectively, and (iii) a series of adjustment factors for 60 goods at the national
level provided by Catas¶us et al. (1986) for the flrst period, and for only 5 goods at the
national level provided by Garc¶‡a Espa~na and Serrano (1980) for the second period.16
For the 1980s, we base the individual modifled Laspeyres price indexes at Winter
1981, and distinguish between the following nine subperiods: 1) From Winter 1981 to
1983, the base year of the CPI system; 2) from 1983 to December 1984; and 3) - 9) from
r to r + 1, where r = December 1984,: : :,December 1990. For the second part of the
1970s, we base the individual modifled Laspeyres price indexes at the midpoint of 1973
and 1974, and distinguish between the following six subperiods: 1) From the 1973-1974
to 1976, the base year of the CPI system; 2) from 1976 to December 1977; and 3) -
6) from r to r + 1, where r = December 1977,: : :, December 1980. The results on the
plutocratic bias in the measurement of in°ation for these two periods are presented on
Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4. The Plutocratic Bias During the 1980s
(In Percent Per Year)
In°ation
t Subperiods Plutocratic Democratic Plutocratic bias
1 Winter 81 to 1983 13.002 12.886 0.116
2 1983 to December 1984 9.484 9.655 -0.171
3 1985 7.782 7.857 -0.075
4 1986 8.230 8.420 -0.189
5 1987 4.587 4.292 0.295
6 1988 5.866 5.956 -0.089
7 1989 6.922 6.962 -0.040
8 1990 6.641 6.474 0.167
9 1991 5.604 5.350 0.254
Winter 81 to Winter 91 8.557 8.524 0.033
The flrst thing to notice is that the Spanish in°ation during the 1970s and 1980s is
considerably greater than during the 1990s. However, as before, there is no relationship
16 For the 1980s, we had to work with a set of 52 goods which constitute the minimum common
denominator between the 58 o–cial r¶ubricas and the 60 goods in Catas¶us et al. (1986). For the 1970s,
the minimum common denominator is given by the 5 goods in Garc¶‡a Espa~na and Serrano (1980). For
the details of these constructions, see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999a). Both series of modifled Laspeyres
price indexes are available at http://www.eco.uc3m.es/investigacion/epf.html.
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Table 5. The Plutocratic Bias From 1973{74 to Winter 1981
(In Percent Per Year)
In°ation
t Subperiods Plutocratic Democratic Plutocratic bias
1 1973{74 to 1976 16.869 16.816 0.053
2 1976 to December 1977 23.024 22.497 0.527
3 1978 16.529 16.246 0.283
4 1979 15.523 14.806 0.717
5 1980 15.311 15.323 -0.012
6 1981 14.541 14.578 -0.037
1973{74 to Winter 81 17.746 17.506 0.239
between the size of the aggregate in°ation in a given subperiod and the sign or the
magnitude of the plutocratic bias. As far as the 1980s is concerned, from 1983 to 1986
and from 1988 to 1989, Bt < 0. The sum of these magnitudes is more than ofiset by
the anti-rich price behavior during the remaining 3 subperiods. Thus, for the 1980s we
observe that B = 0:033 per cent per year, a positive bias smaller than what we saw for
the 1990s. However, from 1973-74 to the Winter of 1991, the plutocratic bias is always
positive and reaches very high annual maxima from 1976 to 1979. For the period as a
whole, B = 0:239 per cent per year, a bias whose size is equal to the sum of the classical
substitution bias and the outlet bias according to the Boskin Commission.
To appreciate the variability of the plutocratic bias during the entire period consid-
ered in this paper, Figure 3 shows the evolution of the inter-annual (month to month)
Bt, t = January 1977; : : : ; January 1998, as well as the inter-annual in°ation rate. Re-
gressing the bias in absolute value against in°ation yields a nonsigniflcant coe–cient
(0.005 with a standard error of 0.006, using generalized least squares correcting for
autocorrelation).
[Insert Figure 3]
These results can be related to those obtained in previous papers about the distri-
butional impact of price changes on household expenditures inequality measurement,
where household expenditures are deflned as total household expenditures net of the
acquisition of some durables but inclusive of a number of expenditures which, although
not included in the CPI deflnition, we believe are part of the best possible approximation
to current consumption of private goods and services using the information available
in the EPF. Using the inequality index I1(¢) deflned in equation (6), Ruiz-Castillo and
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Sastre (1999) point out that the term ¢P in equation (4) is almost 5 times greater
for the second part of the 1970s than for the 1980s. As a matter of fact, Del R¶‡o and
Ruiz-Castillo (1996) reports that although the Lorenz curve of the 1980-81 adjusted
household expenditures distribution at Winter 1981 prices dominates in a numerical
sense the Lorenz curve of that same distribution at Winter 1991 prices, from a statisti-
cal point of view both distributions are indistinguishable, so that the distributional role
of prices during the 1980s is essentially neutral. Nevertheless, for the 1973-74 to Winter
1981 period as a whole, Ruiz-Castillo and Sastre (1999) flnd that the decrease in real
household expenditures inequality |which is equal to 27 per cent| is 37.7 per cent
greater than the decrease in nominal household expenditures inequality; that is to say,
during this period the distributional impact of price changes on inequality measurement
is very important.
5.2. The Aggregation Scheme
In the second place, it is interesting to experiment with other aggregation schemes to
map a distribution of individual in°ations to an aggregate index. Given that the disci-
pline of welfare economics is more interested in personal rather than household welfare,
it is natural to ask for the consequences of estimating the in°ation for the population
as a whole as the weighted mean of individual in°ations with weights proportional to
household size.
Table 6. Average Total Household Expenditures at Winter 1991 Prices
and Average Annual In°ation in the Partition by Household Size
Household Frequency Average Average Annual
size Distribution Expenditures In°ation
1 member 9.99% 1,147,338 4.842%
2 members 22.30% 1,795,808 4.625%
3 members 20.77% 2,559,993 4.634%
4 members 24.97% 3,091,959 4.611%
5 members 13.22% 3,277,244 4.623%
6 members 5.44% 3,516,374 4.627%
‚ 7 members 3.31% 3,629,602 4.619%
ALL 100.00% 2,563,502 4.632%
On Table 6 we present mean total household expenditures at Winter 1991 prices by
household size in the 1990{91 EPF, as well as the mean annual in°ation from Winter
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1991 to January 1998 for that same partition. As in the majority of other countries, we
observe a positive association between total expenditures and household size. Therefore
weighting household in°ation by household size should have a similar efiect, although
of a lesser magnitude, than weighting directly by total household expenditures as in the
plutocratic scheme. On the other hand, the fact that 2, 4 and more member households
have a mean annual in°ation below the population as a whole works in the opposite
direction. The end result is that the new bias |deflned as the difierence between the
plutocratic and the household size weighted mean| is equal to 0.088 per cent per year.
That this flgure is greater than the previously estimated of 0.055 per cent per year
for the plutocratic bias, indicates that during this period the second factor has had a
greater impact than the flrst one.
The same computations for the 1980s and 1970s lead to an estimate of 0.015 and
0.223 for the new bias versus a plutocratic bias of 0.033 and 0.239, respectively. The
fact that the new bias is smaller than the plutocratic bias indicates that the positive
association between total household expenditures and household size dominates the size
of the new bias during these two periods.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In a country like Spain, a commodity basket of 471 goods is priced in each of the 52
provinces in order to construct the set of elementary price indexes which form the core of
the current 1992 CPI system. We have been able to work in a 53 dimensional commodity
space, consisting of the 21 food r¶ubricas at the 18 Autonomous Community level, and the
32 non-food subgrupos at the 52 province level. For such a commodity breakdown, we
construct 21,155 household-speciflc Laspeyres price indexes representative of a 1990{
91 population of about 11 million households. Because of the flxed-weight nature of
our construction, the individual in°ation variation we observe during the Winter 1991-
January 1998 period is the consequence of the price variation publicly disseminated by
the INE in this 53 commodity space.
How can we grasp the distributional consequences of such a complex multidimensional
process? In this paper we propose a procedure which combines three elements. In the
flrst place, whether price behavior in a given period hurts relatively more the rich or the
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poor households can be expressed in terms of a single scalar: the so-called plutocratic
bias, incurred when we measure in°ation using the current plutocratic CPI instead of
using an alternative group index in which all households weight equally. In the second
place, the estimation of an Engel curve system in a 16 goods commodity space, allows
us to reduce the size of the price universe to only three dimensions: a luxury good
and two necessities with considerably difierent total expenditures elasticities. Price
behavior at this level provides an intelligible explanation of the sign and magnitude of
the plutocratic bias. Finally, the change in money income inequality |which is the
only magnitude usually estimated in the empirical literature on income inequality| is
seen to be equal to the change in real income inequality |which is the socially relevant
magnitude| and a price term which captures the distributional impact of price changes
according to consumers’ preferences as manifested via their budget share vectors in a
given moment in time. The price term, and hence the gap between the change in money
and real income inequality, depends on the size and magnitude of the plutocratic bias.
Knowing the plutocratic bias is also important for two other topics in positive eco-
nomics. On one hand, in Spain |like in many other countries| the CPI is not really a
modifled Laspeyres price index. Thus, one can deflne a \Laspeyres bias" as the difier-
ence between measuring in°ation using an appropriate Laspeyres type index or using the
CPI actually constructed in these countries. As shown in Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999d),
the sign of the plutocratic bias determines the sign of the Laspeyres bias. On the other
hand, recent theoretical results have opened up the way to the possibility of estimating
the classical upper level substitution bias in the CPI as the difierence between the in°a-
tion measured according to two readily computable statistical price indexes: a Laspeyres
price index, and a To˜rnquist one for which we only need to observe consumer choices
during the two periods under comparison. In Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999e) we show how
the knowledge of the sign of the plutocratic bias helps us to overcome some di–culties
which arise when we attempt to apply this idea in practice.
But beyond all of the above measurement issues, what are the political consequences
of our research? The flrst question we need to rise is how should we adjust our income
taxes and public transfers annually. At this moment, we do not have anything to add
to the arguments ofiered by others.17 But we should recognize that, in most countries,
17 See Triplett (1983), Fry and Pashardes (1985), Griliches (1995), and Pollak (1998) and, in connection
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income taxes, public pensions, other public transfers, and minimum wages are revised
in terms of a plutocratic CPI. Why should we follow a dollar rather than a household
or a personal logic in this matter? Perhaps because both people and experts believe
that the CPI represents an \average consumer." However, when in an important but
unpublished paper Muellbauer (1976a) asked for the consumer whose budget shares are
equal to the o–cial CPI aggregate weights, he answered that in the UK this consumer
occupied the 71 percentile in the household expenditures distribution.18 At any rate,
indexing by the current CPI has the following perverse efiects which, in our opinion,
have not been su–ciently emphasized before: when prices behave in a anti-poor (anti-
rich) way, i.e., when the plutocratic bias is negative (positive), then we revise public
programs, which primarily beneflt the poor, below (above) what would be the case with
a democratic group index. Similarly, if the plutocratic bias is negative (positive), then
direct tax revenues would be larger (smaller) than what would be the case under the
democratic alternative.
From this point of view, the current plutocratic formula can be conceptually critized.
Admittedly, this issue would be more important the greater the size of the plutocratic
bias (and perhaps, depending on the sign of the bias). In the Spanish case, we have
shown that this bias: (i) has had a positive sign over an extended period of time, (ii)
presents a rather unstable pattern over the short run, and (iii) has had a considerable
size during certain periods of time. There is relatively little information on this issue in
other countries,19 in particular in underdeveloped countries where the relative price of a
to the poverty line, see the National Research Council (1995).
18 See Muellbauer (1975, 1976b) for the theoretical basis of this work. For the U.S. in 1990, Deaton
(1998) estimates that this consumer occupies the 75 percentile. In our case, we have simply computed
the location of Spanish consumers who have an in°ation in a 5 per cent interval of the o–cial one
during the 1990s; the answer is that their mean adjusted household expenditures is in the 61 percentile
of such distribution.
19 For the U.K., Carruthers et al. (1980) indicate that from January 1975 to January 1979 the demo-
cratic index has increased by around 0.1 per cent per year faster than the o–cial CPI; Fry and Pashardes
(1985) obtain also that from 1974 to 1982 the plutocratic bias was negative; for 1975-76, Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980) report that the in°ation rate for the poor was around two points higher than for the
rich; however, Crawford (1996) flnds that, between 1979 and the end of 1992, in°ation for richer house-
holds was 0.16 percentage points higher than the average for all households. For the U.S., Kokowski
(1987) flnds that from 1972 to 1980 the democratic and the plutocratic Laspeyres indexes are rather
close in value for most demographic groups but, in general, the flrst measure exceeds its counterpart
by 1 to 3 index points; Garner et al. (1999) flnd evidence that the plutocratic bias during the 1980s is
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few staples may cause havoc in the standard of living of the majority of the population.
In our opinion, it is advisable to estimate the plutocratic bias on a regular basis. For
this and other purposes, we recommend that statistical agencies in charge of the CPI
compute and make available, at least annually, a set of household-speciflc price indexes.
This idea has the following four advantages:
1. We expect that the farther down we go towards the elementary price level, the greater
will be the dispersion of the distribution of household-speciflc price indexes. How-
ever, we would also expect a larger number of zero expenditures in most households.
Therefore, there are advantages and disadvantages in enlarging the commodity space.
Given that, for confldentiality reasons, the price information at the elementary level
is not publicly available, the statistical agencies are the only institutions in a position
to determine the optimal disaggregation level for the construction of individual price
indexes.
2. Given the set of (o–cial) individual price indexes, anyone |except the statistical
agencies themselves, which should not become involved in political issues| can study
the difierential in°ation sufiered by the subgroups of interesting population partitions,
an issue to be considered prior to the political solution to the issue of \How many
cost of living indexes". Similarly, anyone would be in a position to estimate the bias
in the measurement of in°ation created by the use of the current plutocratic CPI,
instead of other politically interesting deflnitions of what a group index should be.
3. Perhaps more importantly, statistical o–ces (and others) can evaluate the distribu-
tional consequences of their methodological decisions. Take, for example, the Boskin
Commission’s analysis of the quality issue and the introduction of new products,
surely the most debated and critized part of their report. Difierent social critics
|Madrick (1997) and Deaton (1998), for instance| conjecture that new goods and
goods afiected by quality efiects are disproportionately consumed by the rich. In
our own terms, this implies that the set of household-speciflc price indexes after the
correction of this bias should exhibit a smaller plutocratic bias. Are these critics
slightly anti-rich.
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correct? In Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999f), we have put this idea to a test by combining
the structure of the bias for the U.S. economy with the consumer behavior of Spanish
households as given in the 1990{91, 1980-81 and 1973-74 EPFs. The plutocratic bias
after the correction of the quality bias in the intervals (Winter 1991, January 1998),
(Winter 1981, Winter 1991), (1973-1974, Winter 1981) is 0.035. 0.024, and 0.227 per
cent per year, respectively. Since, as we have seen, the plutocratic bias before the
correction is 0.055, 0.033 and 0.240 per cent per year, we can conclude that there is
some evidence indicating that the point made by those social critics is well taken.
4. Muellbauer (1976a) indicates that he does not regard the historical bias of in°ation
as the most important issue. Given that keeping down in°ation is such an important
policy goal, it is natural that any government should be very sensitive to the efiects
of policy change on the o–cial CPI. Thus, the aggregate weights are the forces which
push government policy afiecting relative prices into particular directions. Within
this context, armed with a set of publicly available household-speciflc price indexes,
both the government (and others) would be in a position to evaluate, both ex ante
and ex post, the distributional consequences on the CPI of certain policy actions.
Some would argue that, given the public opinion’s potential sensitivity to the dis-
tributional issues embedded in the construction of a single CPI, o–cially publishing a
set of household-speciflc price indexes would ultimately afiect the credibility of the CPI
itself. But we have shown that anyone can come up with a reasonable version of these
indexes using already publicly available information. In an open society we should not
fear the dissemination of relevant, albeit controversial, information. Or is it the case
that, precisely because \aggregate index numbers are not neutral political indicators"
(Muellbauer 1976a), we should resist making public the statistical basis of this issue?
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APPENDIX: The Modifled Laspeyres Price Index
To understand the relation between a CPI and an aggregate Laspeyres SPI, we have
to start by recognizing that statistical agencies partition the physical space into a set of J
geographical areas, which we index by j = 1; : : : ; J . For every item i = 1; : : : ; I in every
area j = 1; : : : ; J , during each period t (typically a month), statistical agencies collect
price quotes for a number of previously determined item speciflcations in a certain
predetermined sample of outlets.20 These price quotes are aggregated in elementary
price indexes Eijt.21 Conceptually, we can view an elementary price index as the relative
price of item i in area j in period t with respect to the base period 0, i.e.,
Eijt =
pijt
pij0
:
On the other hand, household budget surveys provide information, not on individual
prices and quantities which are often hard to deflne, but on individual expenditures in
each good, xhi¿ , total household expenditures, x
h
¿ =
P
i x
h
i¿ , and budget shares w
h
i¿ =
xhi¿=x
h
¿ . In each area j, we can observe the aggregate expenditures on each good,
Xij¿ =
P
h2j x
h
i¿ , and aggregate budget shares Wij¿ = Xij¿=X¿ , where X¿ =
P
h x
h
¿ is
the aggregate total expenditure for the entire population. Under the assumption that
all households living in the same area face the same prices, we can view observable
household expenditures on item i by a household h living in area j and interviewed in
period ¿ , as the product of a price pij¿ and a quantity qhi¿ , i.e., x
h
i¿ = pij¿q
h
i¿ . Denote
the vector of aggregate quantities actually purchased during the survey period ¿ by
Q¿ = (Q1¿ ; : : : ; QI¿ ) where Qi¿ =
P
j Qij¿ and Qij¿ =
P
h2j q
h
i¿ , then we have
Wij¿ =
Xij¿
X¿
=
pij¿Qij¿
p¿ ¢Q¿ :
If we deflne the plutocratic weights `h¿ = x
h
¿=X¿ , then
Wij¿ =
X
h2j
xh¿
X¿
xhi¿
xh¿
=
X
h2j
`h¿w
h
i¿ :
20 This is where Pollak places the \beer vs champagne" issue.
21 This is where the Boskin Commission places the so called \lower substitution level" problem. Neither
this nor the issue in the previous footnote should concern us in this paper.
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If we have information on what we will call the adjustment factors for each i, Aij¿ =
(pij¿=pij0), then one can deflne the elementary price index based in period ¿ ,
Eijt(¿) =
Eijt
Aij¿
=
pijt
pij¿
:
For each household h living in area j, the Laspeyres SPI which takes as a reference the
quantity vector qh¿ , is deflned by
‘(pt;p¿ ; qh¿ ) =
X
i
whi¿Eijt(¿) =
pjt ¢ qh¿
pj¿ ¢ qh¿
;
where pjt = (p1jt; : : : ; pIjt).
At the aggregate level, let pt = (p1t; : : : ; pIt), where pit =
P
j(Qij¿=Qi¿ )pijt. Sim-
larly, let p¿ = (p1¿ ; : : : ; pI¿ ), where pi¿ =
P
j(Qij¿=Qi¿ )pij¿ . Then the aggregate
Laspeyres SPI which takes as a reference the vector Q¿ is seen to be:
L(pt;p¿ ; Q¿ ) =
X
i
X
j
Wij¿Eijt(¿) =
P
i
P
j pijtQij¿P
i
P
j pij¿Qij¿
=
pt ¢Q¿
p¿ ¢Q¿
=
X
i
µX
j
X
h2j
`h¿w
h
i¿
¶
Eijt(¿) =
X
j
X
h2j
`h¿
X
i
whi¿Eijt(¿)
=
X
h
`h¿
pjt ¢ qh¿
pj¿ ¢ qh¿
=
X
h
`h¿ ‘(pjt;pj¿ ; q
h
¿ ):
For each good i in an area j, let Wij = pij0Qij¿=p0 ¢Q¿ . The CPI based on period
0 is an aggregate SPI deflned by
CPI(pt;p0; Q¿ ) =
X
i
X
j
WijEijt =
L(pt;p¿ ; Q¿ )
L(p0;p¿ ; Q¿ ) =
pt ¢Q¿
p0 ¢Q¿ ;
which is what the BLS calls a modifled Laspeyres aggregate price index (Moulton, 1996),
with base year 0 and reference consumption patterns surveyed at ¿ .
Finally, for household h in area j we now redeflne the plutocratic weights by `h =
pj0 ¢ qh¿=p0 ¢ Q¿ , and budget shares whi = pij0qhi¿=pj0 ¢ qh¿ . Then, as before, aggre-
gate expenditure shares can be expressed as a plutocratic-weighted mean of individual
expenditure shares:X
h2j
`hwhi =
X
h2j
pj0 ¢ qh¿
p0 ¢Q¿
pij0q
h
i¿
pj0 ¢ qh¿
=
pij0Qij¿
p0 ¢Q¿ = Wij
and
CPI(pt;p0; Q¿ ) =
X
i
X
j
WijEijt =
X
i
X
j
X
h2j
`hwhi Eijt
=
X
j
X
h2j
`h
X
i
whi Eijt =
X
h
`hcpi(pjt;pj0; qh¿ ):
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